I feel that I always seem to attack or heavily critique the theorists that we read in our ethnic studies class and I’m not too sure how I feel about that. The reason behind this is that I cannot help but look at the readings through a Chicano lens, which I define as a deconstructive and decolonizing lens. Katherine Hayles’ piece on the posthuman and our shift from humanism to posthumanism provoked the following question for me: what is going to happen to the people, often marginalized minority folk, who have yet to achieve the status of “human” in this posthuman world? What will be their relationship to technology? Will technology and the idea of the cyborg become another tool of oppression by those that have the privilege to hold the title of human or posthuman? I turn now to the description of what it means to be posthuman as I analyze them from a decolonial lens.
To begin, Hayles defines the relationship between the body and information for the posthuman as one where “ . . . the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history . . .” (Hayles, 2). I found that access to this “informational pattern” is a privilege in and of itself, one where historically only the dominant group has maintained access; the histories and informational patterns are determined by a set group of people, where any other type of information is discredited as archaic and invalid. This invalidation of other types of knoweldges becomes important when talking about different modes of survival and advancements. Leading into my next critique, the third viewpoint of the posthuman explores the idea of how we learn to manipulate the body in order to create progress; this manifestation of the western obsession with material/technological advancement allows posthumanists to disconnect themselves from the body in this new relationship to technology.
To specify, Hayles comment that the “ . . . posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prosthesis becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born” (Hayles, 3). I couldn’t help but chuckle that Hayles, or rather posthumanist thought, view the body as the “original prosthesis”, or the original artificial body. The word “artificial” for me conjures up images of a human copy, not original, dehumanization. I found that posthumanists are able to talk about the body as this type of artificial being from a very privileged standpoint, they can have this disconnect without any real consequences. In the case of the minority, dehumanization has real life consequences where their security and chances of survival is threatened because they are the “other”.
Finally, Hayles’ fourth point about humanism is that “ . . . there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation . . .” (Hayles, 3). My question once more is what happens to those who cannot clearly align themselves with the status of human, what will their relationship with technology be under posthumanism?
-Luis
To begin, Hayles defines the relationship between the body and information for the posthuman as one where “ . . . the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history . . .” (Hayles, 2). I found that access to this “informational pattern” is a privilege in and of itself, one where historically only the dominant group has maintained access; the histories and informational patterns are determined by a set group of people, where any other type of information is discredited as archaic and invalid. This invalidation of other types of knoweldges becomes important when talking about different modes of survival and advancements. Leading into my next critique, the third viewpoint of the posthuman explores the idea of how we learn to manipulate the body in order to create progress; this manifestation of the western obsession with material/technological advancement allows posthumanists to disconnect themselves from the body in this new relationship to technology.
To specify, Hayles comment that the “ . . . posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prosthesis becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born” (Hayles, 3). I couldn’t help but chuckle that Hayles, or rather posthumanist thought, view the body as the “original prosthesis”, or the original artificial body. The word “artificial” for me conjures up images of a human copy, not original, dehumanization. I found that posthumanists are able to talk about the body as this type of artificial being from a very privileged standpoint, they can have this disconnect without any real consequences. In the case of the minority, dehumanization has real life consequences where their security and chances of survival is threatened because they are the “other”.
Finally, Hayles’ fourth point about humanism is that “ . . . there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation . . .” (Hayles, 3). My question once more is what happens to those who cannot clearly align themselves with the status of human, what will their relationship with technology be under posthumanism?
-Luis